Defining and Redefining Svalaksana: Dharmakirti\u27s Concept and its Tibetan Modification by Yoshimizu Chizuko & 吉水 千鶴子
Defining and Redefining Svalaksana:
Dharmakirti's Concept and its Tibetan
Modification
著者 Yoshimizu Chizuko
journal or
publication title
Three mountains and seven rivers : Prof.
Musashi Tachikawa's felicitation volume
page range 117-133
year 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/103850
Chapter 8
Defining and Redefining
Svalaksana: Dharmakirti's
Concept and its Tibetan
Modification
CHIZUKO YOSHIMIZU
Recent contributions to the Tibetan development of Buddhist
philosophical systems have attracted considerable attention, not
only because of their significant results but also because of their
methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must
be examined in light of its historicaland cultural circumstances.
Continuity and discontinuity of thought as well as the character-
istics of Tibetan interpretations firstbecome clear through a
thorough investigation of both Indian and Tibetan traditions,
and yet the significance of individual thought is finally to be
considered in its contemporary context. In this respect, the
latest studies of the Tibetan development of Dharmakirti's (7c.)
epistemology were most successful in indicating the consistency
and inconsistency of Tibetan interpretations with Dharmakirti's
original ideas.1 Special attention has been paid to the originality
of dGe lugs pa thinkers. They indeed made several theoretical
modifications to, reinterpretations and reevaluations of Indian
original thought, especially with regard to logicoepistemological
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issues in both major fields of Buddhist philosophy, viz., the
Madhyamaka system and that of Dharmakirti.2 In order to gain a
clear picture of the dGe lugs pa position on these Buddhist
philosophical systems, we have attempted to reveal what might
actually underlie their problematic commitments to traditional
teachings, i.e.,to reveal its historical background, probable tex-
tual sources, possible misinterpretations and wrong transmis-
sions of text,as well as particular aims and motivations they may
have had in mind.
The present paper too is an attempt to clarify the way dGe
lugs pa scholars redefined the concept svalaksana (rang mtshan)
and to specify the reasons for this redefinition on the basis of
the writings by the three main figures from the earlier period of
the school, i.e.,Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa (1357-1419),
rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) and mKhas grub dGe
legs dpal bzang po (1385-1438).3 I also wish to consider the
question of how Dharmaklrti and these Tibetan thinkers under-
stood the meaning of the individuality and reality of existents
under the concept of svalaksana, since defining svalaksana is
none other than defining what an individual and real entity is.
Through the following discussion,one willsee thatboth Dharmakirti
and the dGe lugs pa thinkers define svalaksana not in isolation
from, but in complete accordance with, their respective consid-
erations of relating philosophical issues. As for the dGe lugs pa,
however, it can be said that they aimed to comprehend such
fundamental concepts as svalaksana from a wider perspective,
namely they tried to formulate a version of individuality and
realitywhich holds true not only for the Sautrantika tradition of
Dharmakirti but for Buddhist philosophical systems in general,
including Madhyamaka. I would like to focus on this point in
the last part of the paper.
1. Dharmaklrti on svalaksana
Littie needs to be said about the considerable significance of
the term svalaksa?ia which literally means 'own characteristic',
and conies down to term for 'particular'or 'individual'.Svalaksana
is characterized by Dignaga (6c.) as the object of direct percep-
tion (pratyaksa), i.e.,the object of a cognition which is free of
conceptual construction (kalpandpodha).A Dharmakirti added to
this epistemological notion a clear ontological ground by
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identifying it with that which has causal efficacy (arthakriydsdmarthya,
arthakriydsakti. don byed nus pa), that is, an ability to produce an
effect. He explicitly defines this alone (eva) as ultimately exis-
tent (paramdrthasat) or as a real entity (vastu), in contrast to the
'universal' or 'common characteristic' (sdmdnya or sdmdnyalaksana).
The latter, in contrast to svalaksana, refers to the object of con-
ception or of words that lacks causal efficacy and hence is con-
sidered to be merely conventional and unreal.5 We may be able
to give the broad outlines of the development of the idea from
Dignaga to Dharmaklrti, or from the epistemological to the
ontological characterization of svalaksana, as follows: The fact
that a thing is actually perceived by someone, sometime and
somewhere indicates that this thing exists at that moment at
that place, unless this perception is proven to be false by some-
one else. Since this thing causes a direct perception of its own
image, it is admitted to be causally efficacious. Furthermore, this
thing must be allowed to be real, for unreal things such as a
horn of a rabbit or. an abstract concept like 'eternity' cannot
cause any direct perception. In other words, the arising of a
direct perception should properly presuppose the presence of
something real as its object. Hence the object of direct percep-
tion proves to be existent in reality. In this way, a svalaksana to
be cognized by a direct perception can be identified as a real
entity:
The term svalaksana, as opposed to sdmdnyalaksana or com-
mon characteristic, entails from the beginning that the phenom-
enon is individual, unique and distinct. Dignaga's description
of svalaksana as the object of direct perception may well reflect
the idea that svalaksana is a substantially individual thing, since
it is the function of perception to make substantial distinctions
among its objects. To this extent, one could also say that svalaksana
is a spado temporally individual and unique occurrence, which
necessarily occupies a certain location in space and time, in
contrast to a merely imagined object. The more strict spatiotem-
poral qualification of svalaksana can be derived from Dharmaklrti's
definition of a real existent as having causal efficacy, if this
qualification is linked to the theory of momentariness (ksanikatva),
viz., that whatever is existent in reality is exclusively momentary.6
It is theoretically consistent to interpret svalaksana as a unique
and single phenomenon that occurs and disappears every single
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moment, since svalaksana is a real existent to be defined as that
which has causal efficacy, although such a momentary thing is
far beyond the range of perceptual object.
Besides svalaksana being distinguished.the one from the other
in virtue of their distinct substances, we can also understand
from the literal sense of the word that svalaksanas are known to
be unique because of their characteristics (laksana). Although it
is beyond the function of perception to specify the features of
an entity as, for instance, being a pot, being gold, being round,
and so on, these kinds of unique features of one svalaksana can
be perceived through its image as a whole and help to differen-
tiate this svalaksana from other svalaksanas. Theoretically speak-
ing, such a distinction of svalaksana by its nature too is grounded
in its causal efficacy, because, according to Dharmaklrti, the
difference of nature consists in the difference of causal efficacy7
in the following manner: a svalaksana is known as individual
and unique by its essential nature (svabhdva), since the essen-
tial nature of a real entity is determined by a particular ability of
its cause to produce this entity, and this entity in turn arises
being endowed with a particular ability that is its essential na-
ture,8 Thus considered, it may be proper to say that Dharmakirti's
identification of svalaksana as that which has causal efficacy
provides a clear theoretical ground for both the reality and the
individuality of the entity that is defined by Dignaga as the
object of direct perception.
2. The dGe lugs pa on rang mtshan
The dGe lugs pa thinkers formulated the definition of rang
mtshan according to their own interpretation of individuals and
real entities. Let us look at the following definition, which mKhas
grub proposes for rang mtslian, stillclaiming it to reflect a Sautrantika
position:
"In their own system [of the Sautrantika], the definition of
rang mtshan is the thing (dngos po) which consists (gnas), not
being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e.,
intrinsically], in its essential nature (rang bzhiri) uncommon
[with other things]."9
Neither the object of perception nor causal efficacy is men-
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tioned here as the definiens or the defining characteristic. Nor
is it possible to interpret the phrase 'consisting in its essential
nature ' as implying 'consisting in its own causal efficacy' and
the phrase 'not being conceptually imposed' as implying 'being
directly perceived', once one takes account of the views peculiar
to the dGe lugs pa with regard to rang mtshan and spyi.
One should firstrecall the dGe lugs pa position that rang
mtshan is identical with a real existent which has causal efficacy
(don byed nus pa), but not only rang mtshan is counted as real, nor
is it determined for the object of direct perception alone, for
they maintain that there exist real universals (sdmdnya, spyi),10
and that a rang mtshan appears in a conceptual cognition. Even
it is not contradictory that one and the same thing is rang
mtshan as well as universal (spyi) in its different aspects. They
are not opposing notions but are relative.A pot, for instance, is
a particular (rang mtshan) in relation to its property of being
impermanent (anitya, mi rtagpa), but at the same time it is a
universal as well in relation to its individuations, since the prop-
erty of being a pot is common to all kinds of pots such as
golden pots, silver pots, copper pots, and the like." Under this
condition, the dichotomy between rang mtshan and spyi accord-
ing to whether it is real or unreal, or whether it is cognized by
direct perception or conceptual cognition is on no account
conducive to clarifying the dGe lugs pa idea of individuality
arid reality.
Nor can causal efficacy define the reality of rang mtshan.
Although the dGe lugs pas accept the concepts 'that which has
causal efficacy', 'that which is ultimately existent' and 'rang
mtshan as synonyms in accordance with the statement of
Pramdnavdrtiika III 3, they explicitly note that neither causal
efficacy nor rang mtshan is taught by Dharmakirti as a definiens
or a defining characteristic of ultimate reality, but just as an
instance of those which are to be defined as such (mtshan
gzhi).]2That is to say,whatever is 'that which has causal efficacy1
or 'rang mtshan' is a real entity, but it is not just this alone that
is ultimately real, since there are universals that exist in reality.
Yet the dGe lugs pas maintain that the individuality of rang
mtshan in the sense of 'consisting in its essential nature1 is
grounded in reality, as suggested in the aforecited mKhas
grub's definition of rang mtshan, for the notion of 'not being
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conceptually imposed but from its own side' is adopted as the
defining characteristic of ultimate reality (don dam bden pa,
parmdrtkasatya) by Tsong kha pa:
"The definition of ultimate realityis that which is not merely
conceptually imposed {rtog pas btags pa), but established
from the side of the object itself(yul ranggi ngos nas)."]*
A rang mtshan is a real existent insofar as it meets thiscondition.
In the same way, the rang mtshan is established as an individual
insofar as it is intrinsically abiding in its essential nature. The
essential nature is, however, not necessarily confined to causal
efficacy, since mKhas grub propounds the aforecited definition
of rang mtshan, after having denied causal efficacy together with
the spaciotemporal uniqueness as being the.defining character-
isticsof rang mtshan, by saying:
"Such definitions of rang mtshan on which others insist as
that which exists,without sharing (ma 'drespar) place, time
and essential nature (yul dus rang bzhin) [with other things]
and that which is causally efficacious are unacceptable."14
Neither substantialindividuality nor causal efficacyis the definiens
of rang mtshan either.15The uncommonness of essential nature
is rejected here just because, in my conjecture, it lacks the
qualification of being intrinsic (i.e.,rang ngos nas mthun mong ma
yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnas pa) in contrast to mKhas grub's own
definition, for, as will be discussed below, the non-intrinsic or
conventional uncommonness of essential nature is also accepted
by those who refuse the real existence of rang mtshan. Accord-
ingly, for the dGe lugs pas, rang mtshan is an entity that is
individual and unique in reality solely because of the intrinsic
abiding in its essential nature.
What then is the essential nature that determines a thing as
an individual or rang mtshan? Let us consider this question with
the example of 'golden pot' (gser bum), which the dGe lugs pas
use for rang mtshan when explaining the theory that a rang
mtshan appears to a conceptual cognition.16 Since we have closely
analyzed this problematic presentation in our previous studies,17
I would just like to reconsider what it means to say that 'golden
pot' is an example of rang mtshan.
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First, one should note that such an example of svalaksana
would not be acceptable to Dharmaklrti. Even not appealing to
the theory of momentariness, the word 'golden pot' (gser bum)
cannot directly refer to any substantiallyindividual entity, which
is the object of direct perception, but according to the apoha
theory it solely refers to the universal. For the dGe lugs pa
thinkers, however, 'golden pot' is an example of a particular
(rang mtshan), and 'pot' is a universal (spyi). In Tibetan, this
example is always simply given as 'gser bum＼ i.e.,'golden pot',
which is not accompanied by a demonstrative pronoun, nor by
an indefinite article,nor by a suffix designating the plural. That
is, neither 'this or that golden pot' (gser bum di/ de), nor 'some
golden pot' (gser bum zhig), nor 'golden pots' (gser bum rnams/
dag) is specificallyintended. Since the Tibetan language has no
definite articles and only rarely use the indefinite zhig, the
expression 'gserbum signifieseither a golden pot or the golden
pot in the sense of a generic singular (viz.,a golden pot or the
golden pot in general), which is to be cognized as such by its
properties of being a pot and being gold. These properties are,
on one hand, essential characteristics of a golden pot, whereby a
golden pot is distinguished from other things such as silver
pots, copper pots, glasses,tables, and so on. On the other hand,
they are also common properties to all golden pots, viz.,18-carat
golden pots, gold-plated golden pots, small golden pots, big
golden pots, and so on. That is to say, any individuation or
differentiation among individual golden pots is not, and cannot
be, indicated by the expression 'gser bum＼ The fact that this
example is nevertheless repeatedly applied to rang mtshan means
that it completely meets the conditions of rang mtshan for the
dGe lugs pa. That is to say, a golden pot consists in the essen-
tial nature of being a pot and being gold from its own side
independent of any conceptual construction. To sum up, the
essential nature in perspective of the dGe lugs pa does not
actually differ from common properties, which are identical with
real universals to be signified by generic concepts.
Despite the fact that their understanding of rang mtshan obvi-
ously deviates from that of Dharmaklrti, the dGe lugs pa schol-
ars seem to have formulated such an idea of essential nature on
the basis of Dharmakirti's own words in Pramdnavdrttika I 40. It
is even not far from the truth to speculate that mKhas grub's
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definition cited previously is a modun.aUun c≫iriujaunavunanu i
40. Let us compare them with each other:
Pramanavdrttika I 40) "Since all things (sarvabhava) by na-
ture consist in their respective essential nature (svabhdva),
they are distinguished from their homogeneous and hetero-
geneous [things]."18
(mKhas grub's definition) "The definition of rang mtshan
is the thing (dngos po) which consists (gnas), not being con-
ceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e.,intrinsically],
in its essential nature (rang hzhiri)uncommon [with other
things]."
The similarity in expression is evident. Taking the subject of
Pramanavdrttika I 40, 'all things' (sarvabhava), to be identical
with svalaksanas in the sense of real existents,19the dGe lugs pa
interpreters understand this verse to be intended to teach the
mode of existence of real entities (dngos po'i gnas lugs).'20In this
regard, it seems reasonable to assume that they took this verse
to describe the essential characteristic of svalaksana and adapted
it to their own definition of rang mtshan. To conclude this
section, I would like to propose the following tentative illustra-
tion of Pramanavdrttika I 40 with the example of 'golden pot' in
accordance with the dGe lugs pa interpretation: "The svalaksana
such as a golden pot consists in its essential nature of being a
pot, being gold, being impermanent, and so on. Therefore itis
different from such homogeneous things as a silver pot as well
as from such heterogeneous things as a table, space, etc."21 So
would the verse be elucidated by the dGe lugs pas.
3. Reasons for redefining svalaksana
From the theoretical point of view, the dGe lugs pa interpreta-
tion of svalaksana apparently goes beyond the range of sound
interpretation. It is not exaggerated to regard it as a systematic
revision of the Sautrantika doctrine. This revision is, however,
certainly an outcome of various external and internal factors.
Such a realistic position as the dGe lugs pa thinkers have is
actually considered to have originated with some Indian schol-
ars and have been carried over by Tibetan gSang phu tradition.22
The lack of semantic interest may also be described as a general-
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tendency of this Tibetan scholastic tradition. Of course one
should also clarify,in addition to thishistorical background, the
theoreticalgrounds for the dGe lugs pas' redefinition of svalaksana.
We will devote the last section of the present paper to this
inquiry.
mKhas grub explains the reason for his rejection of causal
efficacy as a defining characteristic of real entity as follows:
"The dBu ma thai 'gyur ba (i.e.,the Prasarigika-Madhyamika)
maintains that rang mtshan is the main [subject] to be ne-
gated {dgag bya) through the logical reason (rtags) to inves-
tigate the ultimate [reality].Accordingly, he maintains that
the ultimate reality consists in the negation of that very
concept (don Idog) of rang mtshan asserted by substantialists
(dngos smra ba),Hence, whatever is asserted by the substantialists
as the very concept of rang mtshan is [none other than] that
which the dBu ma thai 'gyur ba asserts to be unestablished
as a [real] basis (gzhi ma grub) even according to verbal
conventions (tha snyad du yang), for such [things] as that
which [exists] not sharing (ma 'drespa) place, time and
essential nature [with other things], and that which is caus-
ally,efficacious are, on the contrary, accepted by the dBu ma
thai 'gyur ba too [according to verbal conventions]. There-
fore, these [things] are the instances of that which is to be
defined [as rang mtshan} (mtshan gzhi) but are not the definiens
of rang mtshan here in the case (skabs 'dir) [in which the
Sautrantika tenet is treated]."23
Insofar as rang mtshan is a real entity, the 'concept of rang
mtshan1 or the defining characteristic thereof must, on one hand,
correspond to the condition of real existent, the establishment
of which the Prasangika-Madhyamika refutes even convention-
ally.In other words, the concept of rang mtshan is, for the dGe
lugs pas, from the beginning determined as the object of refuta-
tion (dgag bya) from the Madhyamaka point of view, since the
core of the Madhyamaka ontology consists in negating such a
substantial or real existent. On the other hand, the 'concept of
rang mtshan' or the defining characteristic thereof may not cor-
respond to that which the Prasangika-Madhyamika accepts on
the conventional level, for, supposing that such a thing be the
defining characteristic of rang mtshan, it would follow that the
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rang mtshan itself must be conventionally accepted by the
Madhyamika too, which, however, contradicts his position in
which the real existence of rang mtshan is not acknowledged,
neither ultimately nor conventionally. Moreover, it is also an
important thesis for the dGe lugs pas that, in the Prasarigika-
Madhyamaka system, all causal relations as well as causal efficacy
are conventionally established. Hence the dGe lugs pas exclude
causal efficacy from the defining characteristics of rang mtshan
and ultimate reality.-4
In relation to these Madhyamaka positions, the dGe lugs pas
evaluate the ontplogical views of other schools, viz.,Sarvastivada,
Sautrantika and Yogacara, as being substantialist,for the reason
that the latter assert such substantial or real entities as being
vastu (dngos po) or svalaksana {rang mtshan), because they are
'not merely conceptually imposed but established from the side
of the objects themselves' (rtog pas btags pa tsam ma yin par yui
rang gi ngos nas grub pa),2bIn this manner, in order not only to
include universals in the domain of real existents, but also to
hold the consistency with the Madhyamaka ontology, the dGe
lugs pas redefine even the most important concept of Dharmaklrti's
tradition.
What the dGe lugs pa scholars thereby finally aimed at is,in
my opinion, a systematization of the Buddhist philosophical teach-
ings of the four main traditions,i.e.,the Sarvastivada, Sautrantika,
Yogacara, and Madhyamaka. For the dGe lugs pas, the question
of what is a real entity or what is the reality should be answered
not within the narrow scope of one tradition, but in a range of
knowledge that extends over the entire historical development
of Buddhist philosophy. In other words, the dGe lugs pas in-
tended to connect the different systems, which had developed
separately in different periods in India, by reinterpreting them
systematically from one common perspective. What they actually
did, however, is to reevaluate the teachings of other schools in
light of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka of Candrakirti (7c), which
they estimated as the highest among Buddhist philosophical
systems.
This kind of attempt to systematize various philosophical thoughts
in light of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka doctrine, indeed, can be
seen in several discussions in the dGe lues pa exegeses.-1''In its
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historical aspect, it is to be considered as a result of the fact
that Candrakirti's system had won a certain popularity among
Tibetan Buddhists by the period of Tsong kha pa. At the same
time, however, this attempt in turn resulted in accelerating the
reevaluation of Buddhist philosophical traditions in the eyes of
Tibetan thinkers. Firmly bound to tradition, but also creative,
Tibetans intensively engaged themselves in the development of
Buddhist philosophy. Itis a remarkable phenomenon in Tibetan
intellectual history that they rediscovered and reinterpreted many
Buddhist philosophical concepts. Redefining svalaksana is one
of Tibetan challenges to the traditionalsystem of Indian Buddhist
philosophy. In thisregard, it remains a fascinating task for us to
discover and analyze their philosophical commitments and their
underlying motives. In this fashion, we can better establish the
significance of the Tibetan developments in the history of the
transmission of Buddhist thought.
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supposes that the subject of this verse (sawabhdva) refers solely to
svalaksana.
8. Cf. E. Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmaklrti," WZKS
15, 1971, pp.179-211, p.l83f., 188f. and Yoshimizu, "Kqjo na mono
wa naze munoryoku ka", p. (197)f.
9. Yid kyi mun sel(in mKhas grub rje's gSung 'bum Tha, lHa sa Zhol
version) 21b2f. (tr. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality,p.117): rang lugs la /
rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rlog pas btags pa min par rang ngos nas
thun mong ma yin pa'i rang bzhin du gnaspa'i dngos po'o //A similar
description occurs in rGyal tshab's Thar lam gsal byed (in rGyal
tshab rje's gSung'bum, Cha, lHa sa Zhol version) 45b3f. with regard
to the subject (i.e.,sawabhdva) of Pramdnavdrttika I 40 (see n.18
below), where rGyal tshab identifies as rang mlshan as 'the thing
which consists, not being conceptually imposed but from its own
side, in itsessential nature uncommon [with other things]' (rtogpas
btags pa tsam min par rang bzhin gyis gzhan dang ma 'dres par rang gi
ngo bola gnas pa, cf.Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu
rikai (2), p. 23).
10. The dGe lugs pas differentiate spyi (sdmdnya) from spyi mtshan
(sdmdnyalaksana). The latter signifies solely unreal, unconditioned
and imagined object like space (nam mkha', dkdsa). Cf. Tillemans,
op.cit.,p.865f., Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality,p.181, and Yoshimizu,
"Tsori kha pa on don byed nus pa", p. 1114 n. 39.
11. As for the relation between rang mtshan and spyi for the dGe lugs
pas, cf. e.g. Yid kyi mun sel 33a4 (tr. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality,
p.181 and Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu rikai
(2), p.15 n.19): rang mtshanyin kyang rang gi gsal ba la rjessu 'gro byed
pa'i spyi yin par mi 'gal zhing/ Cf. also Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality,
p.l73ff. and note .16 below.
12. Regarding the synonyms of rang mtshan, see the explanations by
dGe lugs pas cited in Yoshimizu "Gelukuha ni yoru Kyoryobu Gakusetsu
Rikai-(1)", pp.58 and 63 n.9. As for their commitments to Pramdnavdrttika
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III 3, see Thar lam gsal byed 210b6f., mNgon sum le'u tik(in The
Collected Works ofTsongkha pa 22 of bKra shis lhun po version ed. by
Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi 1978) 17a5f., Yid kyi mun sel44b
1 ff.(cited and translated in Yoshimizu, op.cit,p.65 n.14). Concerning
the problematic Tibetan translation of arthakriydsamartham in
Pramdnavdrttika III 3 as don dam don byed nuspa and itsinterpretations,
cf. e.g. mNgon sum le'u tik 166bl-4, Thar lam gsal byed 211a3ff. and
the references cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit, p.61 n.8. rGyal tshab states
the opinion in his Thar lam gsal byed 211a3ff. (cited and translated
in Yoshimizu op.cit, p.62) that the qualification of 'being ultimate'
is made to causal efficacyin Pramdnavdrttika III 3 in order to eliminate
the 'false'conception that the causal efficacyis solely conventionally
(kun rdzob tsam du) accepted. This 'false' conception most likely
belongs to the Madhyamikas, as willbe discussed later.In this regard,
itisinteresting to remark that Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan propounds
the definition of ultimate reality as that which ultimately has causal
efficacy (do?i dam par don byed nus pa'i chos) in his Grub mtha (in
Textbooks of Se ra Monastery ed. by Tshulkhrim Kelsang & Shunzo
Onoda, Biblia Tibeticaseries,Kyoto 1985) 4b3 (cited in Yoshimizu,
op.cit.,p.64 n.U).
13. Tshad ma'i brjed byang (in The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa 22 of
bKra shis lhun po version ed. by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi
1978) 34alf.: don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid rtogpas Mags pa tsam ma
yin par yul rang gi ngos nas grub pa / Cf. also mNgon sum le'u tik
17a6f.: don dam bden pa'i mtshan nyid rtogpas btags pa la ma Itos par
rang gi ngos bos dpyad bzod du grub pa / Parallel definitions by other
dGe lugs pas are cited in Yoshimizu, op.cit.,pp.53 and 64 n.ll. The
dGe lugs pas presumably define the two kinds of realityon the basis
of Dharmakirti's own words in Pramdnavdrttika I 68-91, especially
68-70, as I have previously discussed in Yoshimizu, op.cit.,pp.52-57
and "Drsya and vikalpya", p.460 n.5.
14. Yid kyi mun sel21a5f.: gzhan dag yul dus rang bzhin ma ''dres par gnas
pa dang / don byed nus pa sogs rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid du 'dod pa
mi 'thad do// One should note the fact that the similar definitions
of rang mtshan appear in the sDe bdun 'jug sgb Yid kyi mun sel(in
The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa 27 of bKra shis lhun po version
ed. by Ngawang Geleg De mo, New Delhi 1977) 3b6, which is a
glossary of terms, concepts and their definitions ascribed to Tsong
kha pa, but probably descended from Phya pa's tradition of gSang
phu monastery. Yet it seems more plausible to assume that mKhas
grub denies the traditionallyacknowledged definitions, which Tsong
kha pa and he himself have learned from their teachers, rather
than to jump to the conclusion that mKhas grub thereby rejects
Tsong kha pa's view, because, as will be seen below, mKhas grub
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gives his own definition with a clear consciousness of the theoretical
consistency with Tsong kha pa's fundamental ontology as well as his
understanding of causal efficacy. Thus considered, the fact that
the old type of definition of rang mtshan is found in the sDe bdun
'jugsgo might support the originality of mKhas grub's definition, as
I have suggested in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu
rikai (2) ", p.24f.
15. The substantial distinction according to place and time mentioned
here by mKhas grub is, however, on no account concerned with
momentary existents, since he himself describes the difference of
place and time as a rough incompatibility of location such as east
and west and morning and afternoon. See Yid kyi mun sel 33alff.:
snga dro'i ha ba phyi dro med pa dus ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi /. . . shar
la regpa'i rdzas des nub la ma reg pa Ita bu / yul ma 'dres pa'i don yin
gyi / . . . khra bo la yod pa 'irang bzhin de ser skya la med pa sogs / rang
bzhin ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi / Cf. also a parallel explanation in
rGyal tshab's Thar lam gsal byed 451a-4 and the discussion in Dreyfus,
Recognizing Reality, p.H7ff. Moreover, it must be noted that the
momentariness itself is differently understood by the dGe lugs pas
as having a certain duration. Cf. e.g. Yid kyi mun sel 34a2, 34b5ff.
(cited in Tillemans, 17 op.cit, p.884, Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.17 n.23)
and the discussion in Dreyfus, op.cit., pp. 109-114.
16. This explanation occurs for the first time in Tshad ma'i brjed byang
19a3f.: rtogpa layulji liar snang thing'jug pa'i tshul ni / gser bum bum
par 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gser bum yang bum par snang zhing rang gi
dngos kyi gzung bya de'ang bum par snang la snang ba'i ngo na de gnyis
gcig tu 'dres nas snang zhing snang ngor so sor dbyer med pas snang btags
gcig tu bsres pa zhes bya ste snang ba rang mishan dang btags pa sgra don
no // Cf. also Yid kyi mun sel 35a3ff., ICang skya's Grub mtha' (in
mDo sde pa Chapter of Peking version, Buddhist Philosophical Systems
ed. by Lokesh Chandra, Sata-Pitaka-Series 233, New Delhi 1977) 74blff.,
and Thar lam gsal byed 59b5-60a3. This passage indeed has raised
discussions among scholars because of its remarkable assertion that
a rang mtshan appears to a conceptual cognition. For the details,
see the references cited below in n.17.
17. As for the close analysis of this passage, cf. Tillemans, op.cit., p.866,
Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality, p.323, Yoshimizu, "Drsya and vikalpya,"
p.466 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu rikai (2)", p.llf.
18. Pramdnavdrttika I 40: sarve bhdvdh svabhdvena svasvabhavavyavasthileh/
svabhavaparabhdvdbhyam yasmdd vydvrttibhdginah/ /
19. See Yid kyi mun sel 41b6f and Thar lam gsal byed 45b3f. (cited in
Yoshimizu, op.cit., p.22f.). It is Sarikaranandana who interpreted
'all things' to refer to both individuals and universals {Pramdnavdrttika
D152b6). However, this does not necessarily suggest that
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Sarikaranandana asserts the existence of.real universals, for, to
my knowledge, he expresses nowhere such a realistic view. He
includes universals into 'all things' presumably in a hypothetical
sense in accordance with Dharmaklrti's postulation 'sati vet in
Pramdnavdrltikasvavrtti 25, 12. For this issue, cf. Yoshimizu,
"Pramanavarttika I 40 no kaishaku ni tsuite", p.(101) n.10 and
"Drsya and vikalpya", p. 463 n.19.
20. See e.g., Tharl lam gsal byed 46b 1. Pramanavarttika I 40 introduces
together with 41abc (tasmddyalo yalo 'rthdndm vydvrttistannibandhandh/
jdtibheddh prakalpyante) the idea that such concepts of properties as
'being impermanent' (anityalva) and 'being produced' (krtakatva)
are formulated on the basis of the essential nature {svabhdva) of
things, although the real existence of universals, which are identical
with or different from particulars, is unacceptable. Dharmaklrti is
thereby demonstrating that an inference based on the essential
property as a logical reason {svabhdvahetu) is valid for establishing
the reality of entities such as their being impermanent. In fact, he
opens with this verse the long discussion of the apoha theory. rGyal
tshab, however, interprets this apoha section of Pramanavarttika I as
contributing to the establishment of the two kinds of reality(see
Yoshimizu, op.cit., pp. 460-463, 470 Appendix 2). As regards
Pramanavarttika I 40 in commentarial tradition, cf. also Dreyfus,
Recognizing Reality,p.118, Yoshimizu, "Pramanavarttika I 40 no kaishaku
ni tsuite" and "Drsya and vikalpya," p. 463 n. 19. For the dGe lugs
pas, the question of how one can establish reality by means of
inferences, if the meaning of words is mere elimination of others
(anydpoha), overlaps with the question of how the Madhyamika can
prove the non-substantiality and emptiness by means of empty words
(cf. Yoshimizu, op.cit., p. 462 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu
gakusetsu rikai (2), p. 28).
21. It is interesting to note that both rGyal tshab and mKhas grub offer
a similarelucidation in theirrespective commentaries on Pramdnavdrttika
I 40, as I have pointed out in Yoshimizu, "Pramanavarttika I 40 no
kaishaku ni tsuite",p.(101) n.10 and "Geluku-ha ni yoru Kyoryobu
gakusetsu rikai (2)", p. 22f.
22. Cf. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality,pp.193-200 and the references cited
in Yoshimizu, "Drsyaand vikalpya" p. 459 n.l.
23. Yid kyi mun sel2Ia6-21b2 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu, "Geluku-
ha ni yoru Kyoryobu gakusetsu rikai (2)," p. 19): dbu ma thai 'gyur
ba / rang mtshan don dam dpyod pa'i rtags kyi dgag bya'i gtso bor 'dod
pas / dngos smra ba 'dod pa'i rang mtshan gyi don Idog de bkagpa don
dam bden par 'dod pa yin la / de'i phyir dngos smra bas rang mtshan gyi
don Idog tu gang 'dod pa de / dbu ma thai 'gyur ba tha snyad du yang
gzhi ma grub par 'dod pa yin la / yul dus rang bzhin ma 'drespa dang
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don byed nus pa sogs dbu ma thai *gyur ba yang khas len pa'i phyir ro//
des na de dagskabs 'dirrang mtshan gyi mtshan gzhiyin gyi mtshan nyid
min no //
24. Cf. the discussions and textual sources cited in Yoshimizu, "On rah
gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa 111,"Journal of Naiilasan Institute for Buddhist
Studies 16, 1993,pp.l29, 132f and ibid., 17, 1994, p. 327, n.67.
25. This kind of real entity can be properly identified with 'that which
isintrinsically established' {ranggi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa) in opposition
to the unreal, mere conceptual existent (blags yod) or that which is
postulated by names and signs {ming dang brdas rnam par gzhagpa).
The expressions 'rang gi ngos nas grub pa and Wang gi ngo bos grub
pa', which they use in their definitions of rang mtshan and ultimate
reality, are no doubt synonyms of the former, i.e., 'rang gi mtshan
nyid kyis grub pa＼ Also the expression 'rtog pas btags pa' means the
same as the 'btagsyod'. Cf. Helmut Tauscher, Die Lehre.von den zwei
Wirklichkeiten in Tson khapas Madhyamaka-Werken, Wien, 1995, p. 124
n.262 and Yoshimizu, "Tsong kha pa's Reevaluation," Appendix.
26. Cf. e.g., the synthesis of the Madhyamaka ontological doctrine of
non-substantiality and the logicoepistemological system of DharmakTrti's
tradition by dGe lugs pa scholars, which is the object of studies
such as Yoshimizu, Die Erkenntnistehre des Prdsangika-Madhyamaka and
Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan
Madhyamaka Philosophy.
